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INDUSTRY-WIDE LIABILITY: SOLVING THE
MYSTERY OF THE MISSING MANUFACTURER
IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
The theory of industry-wide liability1 is a recent conceptual hybrid of
products liability2 and joint and several liability.3 Industry-wide liability
predicates liability on a manufacturer's adherence to a deficient
industry-wide standard of safety.' The theory is tailored to allow
Courts and commentators have addressed the theory of industry-wide liability
under various names, including "enterprise liability," "joint liability," and the "synthetic
drug industry liability." Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607, 607 P.2d 931, 933, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 141, cert denied 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (Oct. 14, 1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., No.
74-030-070 NP, slip op. at 7 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed May 16, 1977); Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 980, 982 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Industry-Wide Liability]. The
leading law review article on the subject labeled the theory "enterprise liability." Comment,
DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 974 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Theory]. The phrase "enterprise liability," however,
describes at least two distinct theories. "Enterprise liability" has described an economic
theory in which the manufacturer rather than the consumer bears the risk of loss from a
defective product, since the manufacturer is best able to spread the risk of loss. Klimas v.
ITT, 297 F. Supp. 937, 941 n.4 (D.R.I. 1969). In addition "enterprise liability" has referred to
a no-fault products liability system. O'Connell, Expanding No-FaultBeyond Auto Insurance:
Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749, 773 (1973). The DES plaintiffs' proposed theory is
broader than the risk of loss theory advanced in Klimas but narrower than no-fault products liability. Industry-Wide Liability,supra, at 982-83 n.15. The term "industry-wide liability" avoids confusion.
I The law of products liability evolved from claims for personal injury or property
damage caused by the use of a defective product. W. KIMBLE AND R. LESHER, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, § 1 at 1 (1979). Traditionally, a plaintiff must show a defective product, an injury,
and a causal relationship between the defect and the injury to state a cause of action. Id.
In America, products liability originally was based on the concept of fault. 3B A. AVERBACH, HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES § 18 at 29 (1971); see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217

N.Y. 382, 386, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (plaintiff must show product malfunction caused by
hidden flaw attributable to negligence of manufacturer). The subsequent development.of
strict liability, with the increased imposition of responsibility on manufacturers for harm inflicted regardless of fault, reflects the shift towards consumer protection. See Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962)
(plaintiff need not prove negligent conduct but only that product was defective).
Generally courts impose joint and several liability under four different theories: concerted action, alternative liability, vicarious liability, or indivisible injury. Prosser, Joint
Torts and Several Liability,25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 429-42 (1937). Concerted action recognizes
that active participants in a wrongful act will be liable equally with the wrongdoer. Id. at
429-30. Courts apply alternative liability where all defendants acted tortiously and independently but only one unidentifiable defendant caused the injury. Id.at 441. Vicarious
liability holds a master liable for the acts of his servant, or a principal for acts of his agent
acting within the scope of employment or agency. Id. at 430. Where the acts of two defendants combine to cause an indivisible injury, courts may hold both defendants liable for the
entire damage under an indivisible injury theory. Id. at 433. Of these theories, only concerted action and alternative liability are relevant to the development of industry-wide
liability theory. Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 978-79 n.68.
I Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 995. Industry-wide liability can result in the joint
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recovery under products liability law for injuries with latent manifestations.5 Commentators advanced the theory in specific response to difficulties of proof confronting plaintiffs in litigation involving diethylstilbestrol8 (DES),' a hormonal drug given to pregnant mothers from the
late 1940's to the 1960's to prevent miscarriage. Although few of the
estimated 1000 DES cases8 have come to trial, no reported decisions
and several liability of all industry members that manufactured an identically defective
product. Id.
5 Id. A plaintiff must prove seven elements to succeed under a theory of industrywide liability. Id. The plaintiff cannot be at fault for his inability to identify the actual
causative agent and must prove that all defendants manufactured a generically similar
defective product. Id. The plaintiff must show further that the defect in the product caused
his injury and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the manufacturers caused the injury. Id. In addition, the plaintiff must show that all defendant manufacturers owed a duty to the class of which the plaintiff was a member and must demonstrate
that the manufacturers adhered to a deficient industry-wide standard of safety in the
manufacturing or marketing of the product. Id. Finally, the plaintiff must show that all
manufacturer defendants are tortfeasors under the requirements of the proposed cause of
action, whether negligence, warranty, or strict liability. Id
Id at 995-1000. DES plaintiffs encountered difficulties of proof due to the latent
nature of injuries resulting from DES. Id. at 972.
A court first suggested a related form of industry-wide liability in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 345 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The Hall opinion covered two related
cases in which blasting caps injured children. Id. at 358. The court first addressed the issue
of whether a group of manufacturers and their trade association, comprising vitually the entire blasting cap industry of the United States, could be held jointly liable for injuries that
their products caused. Id. at 358. The explosion of the cap made precise identification of the
responsible manufacturer impossible. Id. at 358. The court discussed the application of
various forms of joint and several liability. Id. at 371-80. The Hall court appeared to merge
general elements of concerted action and alternative liability to relieve plaintiffs of the
burden of proving a causal connection between their injuries and a particular manufacturer.
Id. at 378-80. The court held that plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that one unidentified party defendant produced the injury-causing caps. Id. at 380.
Further, plaintiffs must show that each named defendant breached a duty of care owed to
plaintiffs and that the breaches were substantially concurrent in time and of a similar
nature, before the court will shift the burden of proof of causation to the defendants. Id. The
Hall rule is based on an unusual modification of concerted action and alternative liability.
The court allowed the burden of causation to shift to the defendants upon a showing of
industry-wide standards or practices that could support a finding of joint control of risk. Id.
at 374. The Hall court stretched traditional rules of joint and several liability by grafting
elements of the alternative liability theory into the concerted action theory to allow a shift
of the burden of proof.
7 DES is a synthetic estrogen that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved
in 1947 to prevent miscarriages during pregnancy. See Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at
963. In 1971, the FDA barred the use of DES during pregnancy. Id. at 963 n.2. DES is still
marketed in the United States for vaginal disturbances, functional uterine bleeding and
other genito-urinary tract problems. Id. Until recently, drug manufacturers used DES as an
ingredient in post-coital contraceptives. See M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 11.27

(1980) [hereinafter cited as DIXON]; Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 963 n.2. Doctors
prescribed DES for an estimated 3 million pregnant women. Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 13,
col. 1.
" Podgers, DES Ruling Shakes ProductsLiability Field, 66 A.B.A.J. 827, 827 (July
1980) [hereinafter cited as Podgers]. Some of the DES cases have arisen as class actions,
joining more than 1,000 plaintiffs. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 1, at 999 n.94.
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have accepted the theory of industry-wide liability.'
The DES plaintiffs' difficulties in identifying the manufacturer of the
specific injury-causing dosage has necessitated an innovative approach
to products liability law."° Plaintiffs in DES cases are the daughters of
mothers who took DES during pregnancy. Plaintiffs contend that the ingestion of the drug by their mothers resulted in their affliction with
clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and uterus" as well as precancerous abnormalities." The afflicted daughters" seek to hold manufacturers" of the drug liable, despite the plaintiffs' inability to prove which
manufacturer actually produced the specific injury-causing dosage of
DES." Lapse of time, the many brand names under which manufacturers
marketed the drug, and the destruction of pertinent pharmaceutical
records often make identification of a particular manufacturer impossible for either party.' Joinder of all original manufacturers is impossible
I DES plaintiffs' inability to identify the particular manufacturer of the injury causing
dosage has resulted in summary judgment for defendant manufacturers. See Gray v. United
States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs. Inc.,
170 N.J. Super. 183, 184, 406 A.2d 185, 186 (1979).
In cases which have survived summary judgment, no court has adopted the theory of
industry-wide liability. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 77, 289 N.W.2d
20, 27 (1980) (allegations of concerted action defeat summary judgment); Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144 (1980) (modified rule of
alternative liability used to defeat summary judgment); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 566-70, 420 A.2d 1305, 1313-15 (1980) (presumption that all potential defendants
before court allowed alternative liability theory to defeat summary judgment).
" See text accompanying notes 14-17 infra.
Adenocarcinoma is a potentially fatal form of cancer of the vagina or cervix. Proposed
Theory, supra note 1, at 965. Clear-cell adenocarcinoma was rare before doctors began to
prescribe DES. Only three cases of clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina had been recorded
before the onslaught of DES related cases. See Ulfelder, The Stilbestrol-AdenosisCarcinomaSyndrome, 38 CANCER 426, 428 (1976).
12Adenosis, abnormally placed tissue on the cervix or vagina, is the most consistently
reported abnormality. Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 965.
" Estimates of the number of pregnant women who took DES range up to 3 million.
Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 13, col. 1. Because some women took DES during more than one
pregnancy, DES manufacturers may have exposed as many as 4 million "DES daughters" to
cancer risks. Henderson, ProductsLiability, 3 CORP. L. REv. 143, 143 (1980). A recent study
has indicated that males exposed to DES in utero may suffer from a higher incidence of
sterility than other men. See Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 1980, at 18, col. 3. Currently, more than
1,000 lawsuits involving DES are estimated to be in litigation. Podgers, supra note 8, at 827.
" Since 1941, at least 287 drug manufacturing companies marketed at least seven different synthetic estrogen preparations for use during pregnancy. See Abel v. Ei Lilly &
Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 73, 289 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1980); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 565, 420 A.2d 1305, 1312 (1980). Manufacturers marketed DES under at least 70
brand names. Industry-Wide Liability,supra note 1, at 999 n.96.
15 Proof of causation is not the only legal problem facing DES plaintiffs. Class action
certification, statutes of limitations, recovery for fetal injury prior to viability, and appropriate standards of care in drug testing and manufacturing may also hinder the plaintiffs' attempts to recover. See Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 968-71 nn.22-25. Accord,
DIXON, supra note 7, at § 11.27.
18 Many DES plaintiffs are unable to identify which brand of DES their mothers ingested. Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 972. Therefore, the plaintiffs are unable to iden-
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because many manufacturers have merged, have been bought-out, or are
no longer in business.
In order to recover under traditional products liability law, a plaintiff must show that a product is defective, that a particular party is
responsible for the defective product, and that the defect in the product
caused the plaintiffs injury." If the plaintiff is unable to identify the
specific responsible manufacturer, no liability will attach.18 In DES litigation, the identification requirement presents a prohibitive burden of proof
which would bar recovery in most cases. The industry-wide liability
theory would extend the scope of products liability claims by eliminating
the identification requirement and allowing recovery in cases analogous
to the DES cases.19 Industry-wide liability would obviate the identification requirement by shifting the burden of proof of causation to the defendants." Incorporation of elements of joint and several liability into
products liability law would avoid the identification requirement.
Under traditional law of joint torts, only the theories of concerted
action or alternative liability could defeat the cause-in-fact problems inherent in DES and similar cases." Under a concerted action theory, a
plaintiff must prove that each defendant engaged in a group action or
joint venture. A plaintiff must show that all defendants actively participated in a common plan to commit or further a tortious act by
cooperation or encouragement. 3 An express agreement among the defendants is unnecessary if a plaintiff can demonstrate a "tacit
understanding" among the defendants. 4 Evidence of the defendants'
tify the specific company which manufactured the injury-causing dosage. See Gray v.
United States, 445 F.Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588,
611-12, 607 P.2d 924, 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich.
App. 59, 73, 289 N.W.2d 20, 24 (1980).
" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103 at 671-72 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
s See Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22, 31 (D. Minn. 1973) (plaintiff must advance

evidence from which jury reasonably could infer which of two companies manufactured
defective product); R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, §§ 1.41,

4.31 (2d ed. 1974) (identification of manufacturer of product required). Products liability law
has required identification of the product manufacturer whether the action has been under a
negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability theory. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 671-72.
Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 1, at 982-83.
Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 995.
21 See PROSSER, supra note 17, § 52, at 314-19.
22PROSSER, supra note 17, § 46, at 292; see Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 431 (1967) (collecting
cases).

2 PROSSER, supra note 17, § 46, at 292.
SId The California Supreme Court found that a drug manufacturer's reliance on tests
performed by other manufacturers did not constitute "tacit understanding." Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 604-05, 607 P.2d 924, 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140 (1980). But see
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 74, 289 N.W.2d 20, 25 (1980). In Abel, the plaintiffs'
allegations that defendants acted in concert in producing and marketing defective drugs
without adequate testing or warnings were sufficient to state a cause of action under a concerted action theory. Id. at 74; 289 N.W.2d at 25.
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parallel behavior alone cannot support an inference of a tacit understanding." The joint action of the defendants becomes the cause-in-fact
of a plaintiffs injury." Joint and several liability results.'
Courts have used the theory of alternative liability to shift the
burden of proof on the issue of causation to defendants. Courts have applied alternative liability where all defendants acted tortiously, but only
one unidentifiable defendant could have caused the plaintiff's injury.2 In
contrast to the concerted action theory, all alternatively liable defendants are independent tortfeasors2 0 If a plaintiff can join all possible
wrongdoers, the court will shift the burden of proof on causation to the
defendants." The rationale for imposing alternative liability is the
' See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 373-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 996. A court may infer a "tactic understanding" among
defendants from parallel behavior if their behavior also evidences a spoken or unspoken
agreement among them. Id.at 979. The illegal road race, in which the drivers decide to race
their cars without consultation, presents the typical case in which courts will infer a "tacit
understanding." PROSSER, supra note 17, at § 46, at 292; see Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d
218, 221 (Del. 1968).
" See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
= See note 3 supra.
" Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), established the rule of alternative
liability. Under Summers, if all possible wrongdoers are before the court, the court will
shift the burden of proving causation to the defendants. See id. at 83, 199 P.2d at 4. The
Summers court recognized the injustice of permitting wrongdoers to escape liability,
reasoning that the nature of their conduct makes proof of cause-in-fact difficult or impossible. Id. Therefore, a court can provide an innocent plaintiff a recovery despite uncertainty
regarding which defendant inflicted the injury. See id.(by implication); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 B, Comment b (1965), PROSSER, supra note 17, § 41, at 243.
In shifting the burden of proof to the defendants, the Summers court created the fictitious presumption that each defendant was the actual causative agent. See 33 Cal. 2d at
82, 199 P.2d at 2 (negligence of both defendants was legal cause of injury). Since the plaintiff
joined all possible tortfeasors, collective causation was a certainty. Id. at 83, 199 P.2d at 3.
Even with only two defendants, however, the probability of each being the actual cause of
the injury is no greater than 50%. Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 986.
' Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80,199 P.2d 1 (1948), exemplifies the traditional fact pattern in which courts have applied alternative liability. In Summers, two hunting companions negligently shot in the plaintiff's direction, injuring him. Id. at 81, 199 P.2d at 2. The
injured plaintiff could not identify which hunter fired the shot. Id. Nevertheless, the Summers court held both defendants jointly and severally liable for the whole of the damages.
Id. at 83, 199 P.2d at 4. The court reasoned that the plaintiff should not be denied a remedy
because he was unable to identify which of two wrongdoers inflicted the injury. Id. at 82,
199 P.2d at 3.
An implied basis of the Summers court's analysis was that the plaintiff joined all
wrongdoers before the court. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433 B, Comment h
(1965). Under an industry-wide liability theory the plaintiff need not join all possible
wrongdoers. See Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 995. The plaintiff must show by clear
and convincing evidence that an unidentified party defendant manufactured the defective
product. Id. The proponent of the industry-wide liability theory suggests that a plaintiff
could meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence by joining manufacturers accounting for 750/ to 80% of the product market. Id. at 996.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433 B, Comment g (1965).
Id. at § 433 B, Comment h. A recent New Jersey DES case, Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly &
1'
Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980), applied the alternative liability theory to shift

144

WASHINGTON

AND

LEE LAW

REVIEW

Vol.XXXVIII

courts' unwillingness to deny an injured plaintiff a recovery when the
plaintiff can join all possible wrongdoers before the court.2 Joint and
several liability results, unless particular defendants can demonstrate
that they did not cause the injury.'
Traditionally, courts have not applied either the concerted action or
the alternative liability theory to cases with the complexity inherent in
the DES cases. 4 Strict application of these two theories would not allow
the inference of causation necessary to satisfy the identification requirement under products liability law.3 5 In cases where plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate a tacit understanding or join all possible wrongdoers, the
traditional forms of concerted action or alternative liability should not
sustain a products liability action. The industry-wide liability theory
combines elements of concerted action and alternative liability into a
coherent theory in order to obviate the identification requirement and
allow a products liability action. 8
The industry-wide liability theory would be available to each plaintiff who is unable to identify the manufacturer of the particular injurythe burden to prove causation to the defendants, even though the defendants claimed that
all potential wrongdoers were not before the court. Id. at 570, 420 A.2d at 1315. The New
Jersey court recognized a strong state policy favoring recovery by innocently injured plaintiffs who could be denied a recovery because of an inability to identify the source of their injuries. Id. at 569-70, 420 A.2d at 1314-15. The court created the presumption that the plaintiff had joined all potential defendants. See id.
12RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433 B, Comment f (1965).
• In the DES case defendant manufacturers encounter the same difficulties as the
plaintiffs in constructing the causative link between an injured plaintiff and the particular
brand of DES that she took. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 1, at 1000-01. Therefore,
the defendant manufacturers would have difficulty exculpating themselves unless they
could show that their particular product was unavailable at a given time or place. Proposed
Theory, supra note 1, at 996.
Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 973-74.
Application of alternative liability to DES cases requires a modification of the Summers rule. In Summers all possible tortfeasors were before the court. See 33 Cal. 2d 80, 83,
199 P.2d 1, 4. DES plaintiffs have not been able to join all possible manufacturers. Proposed
Theory, supra note 1, at 991. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d
924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144 (1980) (where all manufacturers cannot be joined, modification of Summers rule warranted). But see Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551,
570, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314 (1980) (allegations that all potential wrongdoers not before court
will not prevent alternative liability).
DES cases may not present the "tacit understanding" necessary for a concerted action.
See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 606, 607 P.2d 924, 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141
(1980) (no "tacit understanding" absent allegations that defendants assisted and encouraged
one another to market DES with inadequate testing and inadequate warnings). In Hal v.
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court found six
manufacturers of blasting caps, representing almost the entire industry, liable for injuries
under a theory of concerted action. Id. at 358; see note 6 supra. The Hall court based the
conclusion that the defendants jointly controlled the risk of harm upon allegations that the
manufacturers had delegated safety functions to a trade association. 345 F. Supp. at 372.
Plaintiffs did not advance similar allegations in Sindell.
I Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 996.
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causing product. 7 Under the industry-wide liability theory, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that all defendants manufactured a generically similar product.s The plaintiff must show that the defendant manufacturers
owed a duty of care to consumers. 9 Finally, the plaintiff must show that
the manufacturers adhered to an insufficient industry-wide standard of
safety in the manufacture or maketing of the product. 0 If the plaintiff
succeeds in proving these factors, the burden of proof on the identification requirement would shift to the defendants. 1
The industry-wide liability theory focuses on the activities of the industry as a whole. 2 Plaintiffs would not have to show either an express
agreement or the tacit understanding among the defendants necessary
for recovery under a concerted action theory."3 Unlike the alternative
liability theory, the theory of industry-wide liability would not require a
plaintiff to join all possible wrongdoers. The plaintiff would have to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the product of one unidentified
party defendant caused the injury." If the plaintiff satisfied the clear
and convincing test, the burden on the issue of causation would shift to
the defendants." The plaintiff would be relieved of the prohibitive
burden of proving causation under traditional products liability law.
Each defendant manufacturer could exculpate itself and escape joint
liability by proving that it could not be responsible for the plaintiff's in6
jury.
The theory of industry-wide liability is premised on the rationale
that courts should enhance an injured plaintiff's chances of recovery,
even at the expense of a possibly innocent party. 7 Application of an
industry-wide liability theory would result in a collateral expansion of
liability under products liability law. 8 Manufacturers could be held liable
for harm caused by a defective product produced in adherence to an inThe plaintiff's inability to identify the particular manufacturer cannot be the fault of
the plaintiff. Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 995-96.
See id at 995 (delineating elements of industry-wide liability).
32Id.

40Id.
41 I&

1 Id. at 996.
4 Id.
"Id; see note 28 supra.
Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 996.
"Id. A member of an industry could escape joint liability by showing nonadherence to
the deficient industry-wide standard of safety. Id. Alternatively, a defendant manufacturer
could prove that its product could not have caused the injury. Id.
' See Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1979) citing Hall v.
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (fair under some
circumstances to enhance recovery possibilities of injured victim even at expense of
possibly innocent party).
" See Industry-Wide Liability,supra note 1, at 1001 (liability expanded collaterally by
imposing liability on parties whose only relationship to product is manufacturing similar
product).
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sufficient industry-wide standard of safety. Liability would attach to
any manufacturer regardless of whether the manufacturer's product
caused the injury, or49whether the actual injury-causing manufacturer
was before the court.
Neither the courts nor commentators have accepted the concept of
industry-wide liability.50 Few of the DES cases have reached a final verdict." Therefore, the applicability of the theory to DES cases or cases
with similar fact patterns remains uncertain. Courts appear reluctant to
accept the theory of industry-wide liability given the possibility of farreaching and unpredictable results. 2 Nevertheless, courts have been
reluctant to deny a chance for recovery to afflicted DES daughters.'
Consequently, recent decisions have modified both concerted action and
alternative liability to allow plaintiffs the possibility of recovery without
adopting the industry-wide liability theory.
In a recent DES decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals overturned
a state court grant of partial summary judgment for the defendant drug
companies. 4 In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., the court expressly declined to
adopt an "enterprise liability" theory.5 Plaintiffs alleged that all defendants acted wrongfully in producing and marketing the defective drug."
Each plaintiff alleged that DES caused her injuries." The court found
these allegations sufficient to state a cause of action and defeat summary
judgment under a concerted action theory. The court recognized that
Id. at 1000.

See Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 963.
See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980); Diamond v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Gray v. United States,
445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979);
Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 75-70997, slip op. (E.D. Mich., filed Nov. 6, 1980); Lyons v. Premo
Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (1979); McCreery v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978; Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713
(N.D. Ill. 1978); Morrissey v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (1979);
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, (1980); Thomas v.
Ferndale Labs., 97 Mich. App. 718, 296 N.W.2d 160 (1980).
"zFor cases refusing to adopt a theory of industry-wide liability, see Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 609, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 143 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 77, 289 N.W.2d 20, 27 (1980); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 570, 420 A.2d 1305, 1315 (1980).
' See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144 (1980) (negligent defendants rather than innocent plaintiff should bear cost of injury); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 75-76, 289 N.W.2d 20, 26 (1980) (burden of apportionment of damages shall fall on wrongdoer, rather than innocent plaintiff).
" Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 77, 289 N.W.2d 20, 27 (1980).
SId.
Id. at 71-72, 289 N.W.2d at 24.
Id. at 66-67, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
Under Michigan law, summary judgment only tests the sufficiency of the pleadings.
MICH. CT. G.C.R. 117.2(1). Therefore, the court of appeals did not address defendants' contention that no evidence supported allegations that the defendants had acted in concert in
producing and marketing DES. See 94 Mich. App. at 74, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
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the burden of proof facing the plaintiff would be heavy, if not insurmountable. 9 The Abel court required the plaintiffs to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the named defendants manufactured the DES taken by a particular plaintiffs mother." If
the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof as to any or all defendants, no liability would attach."' The court refused to shift the burden to
disprove causation to the defendants.6 '
The Abel dissent noted that the theory of industry-wide liability
raised constitutional problems. 3 If the court relieved plaintiffs of the
burden of proving that one of the named defendants caused or participated in causing the harm, the named defendants might be denied equal
protection of the law.6 4 Furthermore, establishing fault only on the basis
of a manufacturer's position as a member of an industry might violate
the named defendants' due process rights.6 ' The dissenting opinion failed
to recognize that the theory of industry-wide liability creates only an inference of causation. Under the doctrine of res ispa loquitur, courts have
inferred negligence and causation without constitutional challenges."
A California court also has refused to apply the theory of industrywide liability in a DES case." In Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, the
California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff
could recover damages if she were unable to identify the manufacturer
of the injury-causing product." The Sindell court modified the traditional rule of alternative liability rather than setting new precedent by
adopting the industry-wide liability theory.6 ' The court recognized that
the traditional theory of alternative liability was inappropriate absent
proof that one of the five defendants manufactured the specific injury" See
e2 Id.

94 Mich. App. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26.

Id. at 77, 289 N.W.2d at 27.
See id. (plaintiff must show that one or more of defendants manufactured injurycausing dosage).
Id. at 92, 289 N.W.2d at 33.
62

See id. (due process required that state action which deprives one of property must
have rational basis).
See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, , 154 P.2d 687, 689-90 (1944)
(burden on causation shifted to six defendant doctors and nurses for injury to unconscious
patient); Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1960) (in
dynamite cap injury, res ipsa loquitur applies to both of two manufacturers because components used in one combination); see Comment, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur In
Suits Against Multiple Defendants, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 106, 121 (1969 (res ipsa loquitur
generally applied to multiple defendants where some form of joint liability already exists).

The Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari for Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (Oct. 14, 1980), appears to
have mooted the possible constitutional issues raised by the industry-wide liability theory.
" Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
" Id. at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
11Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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causing product.7" The Sindell court expressly rejected the customary
requirement of alternative liability that all possible tortfeasors be joined
in the action.71 According to the Sindell court, a plaintiff need only join
as defendants the manufacturers representing a substantial share of the
DES market at the time the mother ingested the DES.2 The "market
share" liability theory constitutes a significant dilution of traditional
alternative liability theory. No longer must plaintiffs join all possible
wrongdoers to rely on the theory of alternative liability.
The Sindell court expressly declined to adopt the label of industrywide liability.3 The court refused to expand products liability law by
predicating liability on adherence to an unacceptable industry-wide
standard of safety.7" The court expressed concern that a manufacturer
might be held liable for injury caused by a drug it did not supply despite
the fact that the manufacturer followed government prescribed safety
standards.75 The court did accept the premise that plaintiffs unable to
join all possible manufacturers should not be denied a remedy. 76 This
premise also is the basic assumption underlying industry-wide liability.
Rather than adopt the industry-wide liability theory, however, the court
diluted the traditional rule of alternative liability by formulating a
"market share" liability theory to allow a products liability action.7" The
179
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari of the Sindell opinion.
Modified theories of concerted action and alternative liability can effect the same result as the industry-wide liability theory. All three
theories can provide DES plaintiffs an opportunity for recovery from
manufacturers that the plaintiffs can locate and join."0 Nevertheless, a
manufacturer's adherence to a deficient industry-wide standard pro701

at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139; note 35 supra.
In Ferringno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 570-71, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314-15
(1980), the court found that New Jersey precedent did not require that a plaintiff join all
possible tortfeasors before the court could apply an alternative liability theory.
' Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145
(1980). The Sindell court did not define "substantial share." The court noted that plaintiff
urged the court to define substantial share at 70% to 80% of the market, as suggested by
the proponent of the industry-wide liability theory. Id. (citing ProposedTheory, supra note
1, at 996). The court, however, expressly declined to set a more specific standard than a
"substantial percentage." 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
1 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
7'

Id.

11Id. The court noted the active role of the Food and Drug Administration in
defining standards of safety for the drug industry. Id.
7' Id.

Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 1000.
7' Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
144-45. The Ferrigno court did not have to consider the applicability of either the Sindell
"market share" liability theory or the industry-wide liability theory, because the court
found that existing precedent resolved the identification issue. Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
175 N.J. Super. 551, 570-71, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314-15 (1980).
7' 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (Oct. 14, 1980).
" See text accompanying notes 35-41, 58, 67-73 supra.
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vides a compelling basis for liability. By adopting the industry-wide
liability theory, courts will avoid the confusion of straining traditional
rules of joint and several liability.
Commentators have criticized the theory of industry-wide liability,
arguing that the theory would affect industry adversely by increasing
insurance costs and the number of products liability claims. 1 Imposition
of industry-wide liability would represent a dramatic extension of products liability law. Nevertheless, economic arguments support the
industry-wide liability theory." Tort law has recognized that manufacturers are better able to bear the cost of injury from a defective product
than are consumers. 3 Arguably an industry, rather than the injured consumer, should bear the risk of injury from defective products produced
within the industry.' The drug or chemical industries should not be immune from liability simply because of the latent nature of injuries caused
5
by defective products.1
Adoption of the theory of industry-wide liability also could encourage product safety. Courts have recognized that holding manufacturers liable for defective products or failure to warn of harmful effects
fosters product safety.8 The collateral expansion of products liability
law might provide greater safety incentives. Manufacturers may no
longer be satisfied with adherence to a minimum level of safety set by
" See Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 1, at 1003 (increased number of products
liability claims substantial factor in higher cost of insurance). After the Sindell decision, the
insurance industry joined the drug companies in an unsuccessful petition to the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. Wash. Post. Oct. 15, 1980, at 8, col. 2. The insurance companies
argued that the Sindell decision could make the issuance of commercial liability policies to
drug companies impossible. Id.
Rapid increases in product liability insurance premiums, combined with the difficulty
of obtaining such insurance, has encouraged pharmaceutical companies to establish "captive" insurance companies and become self-insurers. Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at
1004, citing Comment, Federal Taxation Concepts in Corporate Risk Assumption: SelfInsurance, The Trust, and the Captive Insurance Company, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 781 (1978).
Proposed Theory, supra note 1, at 1005-06.
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144
(1980).
. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962) (manufacturers best able to allocate costs and risks of injuries by
redistributing loss among consumers).
' Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144
(1980) (advances in science and technology will result in new, potentially hazardous products which consumers will be unable to trace to a specific manufacturer).
Recent studies have explored the connection between exposure to certain chemical
substances and particular cancers, focusing on the potential legal ramifications. See gener-

ally D.

DONIGER, LAW AND POLICY OF

DONIGER]; M. SHAPO,

A NATION

Toxic

(1978) [hereinafter cited as
(1979) [hereinafter cited as SHAPO]. Because

SUBSTANCE CONTROL

OF GUINEA PIGS

the effects of exposure to toxic chemicals may remain latent for twenty years, the victims
may be able to identify the actual injury-causing chemical but not the responsible chemical
manufacturer. DONIGER, supra,at 11. Therefore, victims of exposure to toxic chemicals may
encounter the same difficulties of proof as the DES plaintiffs. SHAPO, supra,at 173.
" 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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the government. The expansion of liability might result in industry adoption of strict self-regulatory controls. Effective self-regulation might
help to minimize intrusive government regulations.
Ultimately the risks associated with technological advancement will
have to be allocated in some manner. Arguably, courts should await
legislative action before judicially delegating the risk of injury." Absent
legislative action, some courts will refuse for policy reasons to deny
recovery to plaintiffs in cases with complex causation elements."
Industry-wide liability provides a coherent and consistent theory to
overcome the difficulty of proving causation in products liability actions
with latent injury manifestation.
W. IAN LAIRD

See Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 1, at 1019 (proposing limited version of
no-fault products liability termed "latent technological injury compensation").
See generally Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980); Ferrigno v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980).

